By Ambassador Chuks Ododo
In most stable democracies, entering public office requires a trade-off: accepting public scrutiny and modest compensation in exchange for the privilege of shaping policy. In Nigeria, that social contract is flipped on its head. Entering public office is widely viewed not as a sacrifice, but as the single most effective pathway to generational wealth.
This structural reality explains the sharp contrast in Nigerian democracy: political parties deploy world-class strategic precision to win elections, only to suffer complete operational paralysis when tasked with governing. When political office functions as an extractive asset, elections become high-stakes financial contests. Victory is driven by asset recovery rather than service delivery.
The Economics of Extraction
The sheer financial return on political office in Nigeria distorts the core incentives of public governance. According to estimates by civil society organisation BudgIT, the annual cost of maintaining a single Senator stands at approximately ₦1.2 billion, while a member of the House of Representatives costs around ₦900 million.
To put these figures in perspective:
- The National Assembly’s budget reached ₦370 billion, a figure that exceeds the entire federal allocation dedicated to basic education across the country.
- A worker earning the national minimum wage of ₦70,000 per month would need to work for over 1,400 years to earn what a single senator consumes in twelve months.
- At the state level, outgoing governors routinely vote themselves eye-watering pension packages featuring luxury residences in choice cities, fleets of vehicles renewed every few years, fully funded domestic staff, lifetime healthcare, and dedicated security details.
When public office yields returns that rival private equity, political campaigns cease to be competitions of ideas. They become high-risk, high-return business ventures.
THE ASSET-RECOVERY LOGIC OF TENURE
Research by Yiaga Africa and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) consistently highlights how the astronomical price of political entry corrupts the entire democratic process.
The barrier begins at the primary stage, where political parties charge exorbitant sums for nomination forms. Addressing this commercialisation, Samson Itodo, Executive Director of Yiaga Africa, observed:
“The manner in which political parties increase the cost of nomination forms reinforces political parties as rent-seeking enterprises with no regard for inclusive democratic participation… It affirms that virtually all the parties subscribe to the view that money, being ‘the mother’s milk of politics,’ should define leadership recruitment.”
When candidates must spend hundreds of millions or billions of Naira just to secure a party ticket and run a campaign, they rely heavily on political financiers, “godfathers,” and personal debt. Consequently, the operational logic of tenure changes instantly upon taking office. The first priority is not policy execution; it is asset recovery and investor payout.
CDD’s research into electoral finance reveals that this reliance on opaque funding streams entrenches clientelism. Lawmakers and executive officials spend their terms securing lucrative contracts, inflating budget line items, and distributing patronage to recover campaign expenditures and build war chests for the next cycle. Governance is not ignored by accident; it is displaced by design.
THE LEGISLATIVE PARADOX: WHY THE SYSTEM WILL NOT REFORM ITSELF
Why doesn’t the National Assembly legislate away these distortions? The answer lies in a fundamental conflict of interest: a system cannot easily be reformed by those who profit from its flaws.
- Financial Autonomy as a Shield: The National Assembly enjoys “First Line Charge” status on the consolidated revenue fund. This means it controls its own budget without executive oversight, allowing lawmakers to set their own allowances, purchase fleet vehicles, and expand operational funds largely shielded from public scrutiny.
- Institutional Capture: Party structures are heavily influenced by sitting legislators and executive officials who use their financial leverage to block reform-minded outsiders. Lawmakers who push for radical pay cuts or campaign finance transparency risk losing party backing during the next election cycle.
- The Godfather Network: Because winning requires massive capital, lawmakers remain accountable to political sponsors rather than their constituents. Voting to reduce political rents directly undermines the returns expected by those sponsors.
Expecting the legislature to self-regulate its perks is like asking a monopoly to vote for its own dissolution. Meaningful change requires structural circuit-breakers enforced from the outside.
CIRCUIT-BREAKERS: STRATEGIES TO DE-COMMERCIALIZE NIGERIAN POLITICS
Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle requires structural changes that lower the financial return of political office while raising the cost of non-performance.
1.Uncouple Legislative Remuneration from Self-Regulation
The constitutional power of the National Assembly to determine its own running costs must be curtailed. An independent, citizen-led body comprising representatives from organised labour, professional bodies, and civil society should benchmark legislative compensation against civil service pay scales. Transitioning state and national assemblies to a part-time sitting model would also eliminate full-time executive perks and deter career fortune-seekers.
2.Statutory Caps on Party Nomination Fees. The Electoral Act must be amended to impose strict, legally binding caps on political party nomination fees. If political parties function as public institutions receiving electoral oversight, they cannot be allowed to price out 99% of the population. Violations should result in the disqualification of the party’s candidates by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
3.Real-Time Campaign Finance Auditing
While campaign spending limits exist on paper, enforcement is virtually non-existent. INEC’s Political Party Monitoring Department must be unbundled into an independent Campaign Finance & Electoral Offences Commission. Utilising digital banking tracking and mandatory public disclosure portals, this agency should audit campaign expenditures in real time and prosecute infractions swiftly and transparently.
4.Outlaw Exorbitant Gubernatorial Pensions
State Houses of Assembly must be pressured through public interest litigation and coordinated civil society advocacy to repeal executive pension laws that grant lifetime luxuries to former governors. Federal allocations to states that retain these pension packages should face conditional withholdings or public audit triggers.
5.Expand Independent Candidacy
Passing robust independent candidacy legislation would allow credible citizens to run for public office without paying exorbitant fees to political party cartels. This would create genuine competition and force traditional parties to reconsider their rent-seeking models.
CONCLUSION
Nigeria’s democracy cannot survive indefinitely as a high-yield investment scheme for a small political elite. As long as political office remains the fastest route to unearned wealth, campaigns will remain violent, political parties will remain policy-barren, and elected officials will treat governance as an afterthought.
De-commercialising politics is not merely an administrative goal; it is an urgent requirement for national survival. Only when political office carries modest financial rewards and heavy public accountability will Nigeria attract leaders driven by a genuine strategy for governance rather than a strategy for extraction.
